Economic Effects of Increased Control Zone Sizes in Conflict Resolution by Datta, Koushik
NASA/CR--1998-207889
Economic Effects of Increased Control Zone Sizes in
Conflict Resolution
Koushik Datta
Sverdrup Technology, Inc.
600 William Northern Blvd.
Tullahoma, TN 37388
Prepared for
Ames Research Center
CONTRACT NAS2-13767
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California 93035-1000
April 1998
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19980137603 2020-06-15T23:37:01+00:00Z
NASA Center for AeroSpace Information
800 Elkridge Landing Road
Linthicum Heights, MD 21090-2934
Price Code: A03
Available from:
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 2216 !
Price Code: A03
Economic Effects of Increased Control Zone Sizes in Conflict Resolution
Koushik Datta
Abstract
A methodology for estimating the economic effects of different control zone sizes used in
conflict resolutions between aircraft is presented in this paper. The methodology is based on
estimating the difference in flight times of aircraft with and without the control zone, and
converting the difference into a direct operating cost. Using this methodology the effects of
increased lateral and vertical control zone sizes are evaluated.
Background
Aircraft conflict detection and resolution methodologies have been under research and
development for several years. Out of these efforts have arisen at least four decision support
tools for air traffic control automation - User Request Evaluation Tool (URET, Ref. 1 & 2),
Conflict Prediction and Trial Planning Tool (Ref. 3), Prediction/Resolution Advisory Tool
(PRAT, Ref. 4) and En Route Operational Display and Input Development system (ODID, Ref.
5). Another project, the ARC2000 (Automatic Radar Control for the years beyond 2000, Ref. 6
& 7) has produced demonstrator components but is not yet implementable, as it lacks the human-
machine interfaces for controllers.
All of these tools are initially targeted towards the en route automation programs and are
designed to maintain the radar separation standards in force. The horizontal radar separation
standard in US en route airspace is typically 5 nautical miles (nm) below FL 600 and 10 nm at or
above FL 600 (FL stands for flight level). The IFR vertical separation standard is 1000 feet
below FL 290, and 2000 feet at or above FL 290. Reduced vertical separation requirements from
2000 to 1000 feet separation minima above FL 290 is currently planned for the North Atlantic,
and are being considered in the future for US domestic airspace (Ref. 8).
In this paper, the volume of airspace surrounding an aircraft with the relevant separation
standards is called the Protected Zone. All of the conflict detection and resolution tools are
designed to keep aircraft from penetrating the Protected Zones (PZ) of other aircraft. To achieve
this safety level, all of these tools have a Control Zone (CZ) associated with each aircraft. The
CZ is the volume of airspace surrounding an aircraft which the conflic.t prediction algorithms use
to predict possible, future PZ penetrations. These CZs are at least as large as the PZs, see Figure
1. There is an inherent uncertainty in all of the conflict prediction algorithms, for example, due
to inaccuracies in wind or position data. Because of this uncertainty and the desire to keep false
positive (aircraft predicted to be in conflict, when in reality they will not be in conflict) and false
negative (aircraft predicted to not be in conflict, when in reality they will be in conflict) alerts to
a minimum each of the different tools have a different buffer designed around the PZ of the
aircraft. These result in different size CZ designed around the aircraft - the CZ consists of the PZ
and the buffer around the PZ. Depending on the algorithms used, the geometry of conflict,
aircraft types involved, or the aircraft phase of flight may affect the size of the CZ, i.e., the CZ
may not be of the same fixed size under all conditions.
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Figure 1: An Exampleof aHorizontalProtectedZoneanda ControlZone
With increasingCZ size,two thingshappen- first, moreconflicts aredetectedbetween
aircraft, andsecond,to resolvea predictedconflict largerdeviatingmaneuverswill be required
by theaircraft involved. Theselargermaneuversfor moreconflictsresultin additionalfuel burn
andlongertimesto destination,i.e., increaseddirectoperatingcosts.
Purpose
The objective of this study is to evaluate order-of-magnitude estimates of the increased
direct operating cost due to different Control Zone (CZ) sizes in Class A airspace (above FL
180).
This study will not evaluate any of the above mentioned conflict detection and resolution
decision tools, nor will it evaluate the current system involving air traffic controllers. However,
the results of this study can be used by a decision maker to:
1) Obtain the increased direct operating cost due to a conflict detection and resolution decision
support tool over optimal paths,
2) Compare the additional costs between two such conflict detection and resolution decision
support tools.
In both of the above cases, the decision maker must have an idea of the size of the CZs that is
used by the tools under investigation.
Methodology
An overview of the methodology is shown in Figure 2. First, a simulation run of the no
conflict resolution (CZ = 0) scenario is run. This means that none of the aircraft will have to
maneuver out of their desired flight path, and so this scenario represents the smallest time and
lowest cost scenario. For all other non-zero CZ size, alternate simulations are run. In these
simulations, aircraft will have to deviate out of their desired flight path to resolve any predicted
conflicts. These conflict resolution maneuvers result in additional time and additional cost for
these alternate scenarios. The total flight time is measured during the simulations of the two
scenarios. The difference between these two total flight times is then scaled up and converted to
the final measure - annual, additional direct operating cost. Scaling up is required for two
reasons - first, because of the limited conflict resolution capability of the simulation tool there
will be a number of conflicts that are not resolved, and second, to go from the number of flights
simulated to the total number of flights per year.
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Figure 2: Overview of the Methodology
This scaling up and conversion results in the following equations:
Annual Additional Total # conflicts
# flights/year
a,dditional = time/conflict * in class A airspace *
# flights simulated/day
DOC resolution in simulation
DOC
rate (1)
where, DOC = Direct Operating Cost,
Additional
time/conflict
resolution
Difference in total # flight hours between
alternate CZ scenario and CZ = 0 scenario
Total # conflicts resolved in alternate CZ scenario
Total # conflicts # resolved conflicts # unresolved conflicts
in class A airspace = in class A airspace + in class A airspace
in simulation
(2)
(3)
Theinherentassumptionsof this methodology are that:
1) Decision support tools for conflict detection and resolution would resolve all conflicts.
2) The simulation tool is reasonably good and resolves a large number of the conflicts but may
not resolve all conflicts. So, on the average the additional time per conflict determined from
the resolved conflicts, will also be the additional time per conflict required for resolving the
unresolved conflicts in class A airspace. Also, this additional time per conflict resolution is
representative of the decision support tool being simulated.
3) A large sampling of the flights in a day are simulated, so that a linear scaling up to the total
number of annual flights is representative of the total number of conflicts generated per year
in Class A airspace.
4) The number of conflicts and additional time required per conflict generated by the simulation
is representative of the actual scenario being modeled.
5) Multiplying the additional time with a direct operating cost rate will produce a representative
additional direct operating cost for the fleet of aircraft over the year.
Alternate Control Zone Scenarios Simulated
To evaluate the increased direct operating cost due to different CZ sizes in Class A
airspace, the following scenarios were simulated. All the CZs were assumed to be cylindrical in
shape, similar in shape to current aircraft separation standards, with a vertical dimension that
represents the height of the cylinder and a lateral dimension that represents the radius of the
cylinder.
1) No Conflict Resolutions (CZ = O) Scenario: As outlined in the methodology, all other
scenarios will be compared to this scenario.
Effect of Changing Lateral Control Zone Size: All these scenarios have a CZ that is 1000
feet vertically, but has different lateral sizes of 3, 5, 7.5, 10, or 15 nm respectively.
Comparison of the results of these scenarios will show the effect of increased lateral CZ
sizes.
Efject of Changing Vertical Control Zone Size: All these scenarios have a CZ that is 5 nm
laterally, but has different vertical sizes of 1000, 1500 and 2000 feet respectively.
Comparison of the results of these scenarios will show the effect of increased vertical CZ
sizes. A priori, it is expected that because of cruising flight level assignments in class A
airspace of the USA, that there will be a big difference in cost between vertical CZs of 1500
and 2000 feet.
2)
3)
Evaluation
To evaluate the methodology of the previous section, a fast time simulation tool called
Total Airspace and Airport Modeller (TAAM, version 2.9.3, Ref. 9) was used. Most of this
section provides a short description of TAAM and the data used in the simulations. Also in this
section is the description of the aircraft direct operating cost rate used in the analysis.
TAAM
TAAM is a SUN workstation based computer program for fast time simulations of airport
and airspace operations. A TAAM simulation consists of a project, which is a collection of user
provided data that pertains to the specified study and its modeling requirements, see figure 3.
4
Limited Weather. Limited Wind
Air Traffic Schedule
\
Environment Descrimion _ \
- Airport Parameters _ k_
- Airspace Parameters _ ,
- Aircraft Performance Data Tables
- Geography
Aircraf_ Trajectory
Air Tr_ffi¢ Control
- Airport Control Rules
- Airspace Control Rules
- Hockey Puck Shaped Aircraft
Protection Zone
- One-on-one Conflict
Resolution Rules
Output Control
Eg: Flight Data
Recording
v
v
TAAM
- Airport Usage
- Airspace Usage
- Conflict Detection
- Conflict "Resolution"
- Aggregate Metrics
Calculation
- Limited Traffic Flow' Rules
-----I_ out__qmm
- Metrics Reporting
- Error Reporting
- Visualization of the Simulation
Parametric Analysis
Figure 3" Conceptual Description of TAAM
Maps and airport layouts are built in the graphics tool set of TAAM. The environment is built in
the interactive data input system of TAAM from the geographical data, waypoints, airports,
routes, sectors, and terrain. The factors regulating and limiting the air traffic are set from a rule-
base that includes the separation and wake turbulence spacing criteria, conflict detection and
resolution rules, and sequencing parameters. The traffic demand in the environment is chosen
from the traffic timetable and the aircraft performance characteristics. This data is passed on to
the simulation program where it is processed by TAAM algorithms. Once the TAAM simulation
is started successfully, graphics windows and panels are created. During the simulation, statistics
are gathered by the reporting program and are written to a report file. This file is used by the
report presentation facility of TAAM to construct the text and graphical reports desired by the
user.
Data Input to TAAM
Air traffic schedule: The air traffic schedule file used for this study was obtained from Enhanced
Traffic Management System (ETMS) data for April 10, 1996 (Ref. 10). The traffic schedule
included 26,673 flights. The schedule specified each flight's identification number, aircraft
equipment type, cruise altitude, origin and destination airport, and actual departure and arrival
time. The ETMS includes data for all flights that filed a flight plan - typically, this is expected to
be 50,000 to 60,000 flights/day. However, the provided data showed that a very large number of
the flight data had incomplete information, no departure or arrival message tags, and these were
eliminated from the air traffic schedule. For a smaller, but significant number of aircraft, mostly
military, no aircraft performance data was available and they were also eliminated from the air
traffic schedule.
Aircraft Trajecton. v To simulate a future free flight scenario, it was assumed that all aircraft flew
direct from origin to destination at the cruise altitude obtained from the ETMS data. The ETMS
recorded flight paths have no conflicts between aircraft as predicted conflicts were resolved by
air traffic controllers. Simulating the original ETMS data in TAAM would thus have produced
conflict-free trajectories.
Aircraft Separation Standard: To simulate the effect of a Control Zone, the separation standard
in each simulation was set to the desired CZ size. TAAM would then try and keep the aircraft
from approaching a distance closer than the CZ size.
Conflict Resolution Rules: A basic set of conflict resolution rules was used in the TAAM
simulations - in order of priority are changes in heading, altitude, and speed. TAAM uses a pair-
wise conflict resolution strategy that is not as broad and comprehensive as the strategies that are
used by air traffic controllers. Consequently, with multi-aircraft conflict scenarios often there are
no successful resolution strategies obtained by TAAM. In these cases, TAAM puts out a
message that the conflict cannot be resolved and continues to fly the aircraft with no resolution
maneuver. This becomes especially important with larger separation standards, as will be seen in
the results section. To appropriately account for these unresolved conflict cases, the scaling up
methodology was formulated.
Airspace: In the simulation runs, the US airspace was divided into two large rectangular
parallelepipeds covering the area of the continental US - one going from ground level to FL 180,
and another covering FL 180 to FL 600. The latter volume then covered the Class A airspace.
Instead of evaluating the effects on the existing air traffic control center airspace, this
simplification allowed for an easy evaluation of the effects of different CZ size in Class A
airspace. The simulations included conflict resolutions in the lower airspace (ground to FL 180)
so that the aircraft would arrive in Class A airspace with the appropriate separations.
Other Input Files: The effects of weather and wind were not simulated. The airport and
geography input data files were files created for past work and remained unchanged.
Aircraft Direct Operating Cost Rate
From past studies (Ref. 11, 12) the average weighted direct operating costs for all aircraft
operations is found to be approximately the direct operating costs of a twin-engine large jet
aircraft. This reflects the predominance of this aircraft type in the IFR traffic schedules. The
operating oil and fuel cost along with the maintenance cost (in 1996 dollars) of a twin-engine
large jet is $830/hour (Ref. 13). This cost does not include crew costs as conflicts and conflict
resolutions are unpredictable and relatively unlikely events, and schedule determinations are not
made based on these events. This cost is assumed in the rest of the analysis to be the average
weighted direct operating cost rate for all aircraft in the IFR traffic schedule.
Total Number of Annual Flights
The FAA forecasts 48.1 million instrument operations nationwide in 1996 and 58.2
million in 2007 (Ref. 14). The forecasts represents the total number of takeoff and landings by
Air Carrier, Commuter/Air Taxi, General Aviation and Military aircraft. These correspond to
24.1 and 29.1 million flights annually in 1996 and 2007. In the simulations the conflict numbers
are only based on conflicts in Class A airspace, so scaling up the number of flights simulated
with all IFR flights, assumes that for all these flights the same fraction of aircraft fly in Class A
airspace and have predicted conflicts at the same rate. All these predicted conflicts are then
resolved by a conflict detection and resolution tool.
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TAAM Simulation Runs
In all of the following TAAM simulation runs the separation standard in the airspace was
changed. TAAM resolves conflicting aircraft so as to keep them from violating the separation
standard. Thus, the effect of separation standard change in TAAM is equivalent to a change in
CZ size, thereby evaluating the effects ofa CZ size.
1) No Conflict Resolution (CZ = O) Scenario: No conflict detection and resolution was invoked
in this simulation run. This case corresponds to direct flights with no flight path changes, i.e.
CZ = 0 scenario.
2) Effect of Changing Lateral Control Zone Size: The separation standard was set to 1000 feet
vertically in all airspace. To simulate the effect of changing lateral CZ size, the TAAM
simulation runs were run with separation standards of 3, 5, 7.5, 10, and 15 nm respectively.
Comparison of the results of these scenarios will show the effect of increased lateral CZ
sizes.
3) Effect of Changing Vertical Control Zone Size: The separation standard was set to 5 nm
laterally in all airspace. To simulate the effect of changing vertical CZ size, the TAAM
simulation runs were run with vertical separation standards of 1000, 1500 and 2000 feet
respectively. Comparison of the results of these scenarios will show the effect of increased
vertical CZ sizes.
In addition to the above mentioned simulation runs, other simulations were performed to evaluate
other effects that could affect the results obtained in the simulation runs (1) through (3). The a
priori assumption is that these effects are of a smaller order than the effect of different CZ sizes.
These simulations were run to corroborate the assumption that these effects are of a smaller
order. The other effects evaluated were:
4) Effect of Departure Time Randomization: Since the economic results are dependent on the
total number of conflicts in Class A airspace and conflicts are very time-dependent, the effect
of departure time on the number of conflicts could be significant. To evaluate this effect,
non-randomized departure times were compared against randomized departure times of 5 and
l0 minute uniform distributions beyond the scheduled departure times. A separation
standard of 5 nm lateral and 1000 feet vertical were used in these simulations. A specific
randomization feature of TAAM was used that allowed for the randomization of scheduled
departure times.
5) Effect of Conflict Resolution Strategy: Since the economic results are dependent on the
additional time per conflict and that is conflict resolution strategy dependent, the effect of
different conflict resolution strategies on the economic results could be significant. To
evaluate this effect, the base case conflict resolution strategy was compared against an
alternate conflict resolution strategy where the order of priority is changes in altitude,
heading, and speed. Two simulations were run - one with a separation standard of 3 nm
lateral and 1000 feet vertical and another with 5 nm lateral and 1000 feet vertical. These
were compared against the base case conflict resolution strategy for the same separation
standards.
6) Effect of current separation standards above FL 290: While evaluating the effect of different
lateral CZ sizes, the simulations were run with the same vertical separation standard in all of
Class A airspace (FL 180 and above). However, the vertical separation standard above FL
290 is 2000 feet and is 1000 feet below FL 290. Could this be a significant effect? To
evaluate this effect, another simulation was run where the upper airspace was sub-divided
into two: one from FL 180 to FL 290 with a separation standard of 5 nm and 1000 feet, and
the other from FL 290 to FL 600 with a separation standard of 5 nm and 2000 feet. This
simulation was compared against the simulation run of scenario (2) where the separation
standard was 5 nm lateral and 1000 feet vertical for all of FL 180 to FL 600.
Results
The results of the simulation runs are presented in Table 1. It shows that for increasing
lateral CZ size (separation standard in TAAM) the total number of flight hours increases, and the
number of resolved and unresolved conflicts also increases. It also shows that for small CZ sizes
the conflict resolution strategy implemented in TAAM is adequate and resolves a large fraction
of the conflicts. However, with increasing size, a larger fraction of the conflicts remain
unresolved. These results indicate, that not taking into account the effect of unresolved conflicts
could produce trends that are not accurate. To remove the effect of unresolved conflicts, the
scaling-up factor for unresolved conflicts described in the methodology section was
implemented.
With regard to different vertical CZ sizes, Table 1 shows that for 1000 or 1500 feet CZ
the total flight hours are about the same but increases considerably for a CZ size of 2000 feet.
With regards to the other effects, the total flight hours does not change by a significant amount
indicating that these other effects are of a smaller order than the effects due to CZ size.
The results of Table 1 are converted to direct operating cost results, using the equations
(1), (2), and (3) of the methodology section, and are presented in Table 2. All economic results
are presented in 1996 dollars for direct route flights. Some of these results are also presented in
Figures 5 and 6.
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Figure 4: Effect of Including Costs of Unresolved Conflicts - Increased Annual Costs (in 1996 $)
in Class A Airspace Due to Different Lateral Control Zone Sizes for 1996 traffic
Scenario
No resolution scenario
Total Number
of Flight Hours
CZ = 10 nm
Number of Resolved Conflicts
<FL 180 >= FL 180
(Class A)
CZ = 0 29005
DifJerentlateral CZs
CZ = 3nm 29019 4146 2774
CZ = 5nm 29061 7139 4720
CZ = 7.5nm 29149 11255 7438
29245 14187 10516
CZ= 15nm
D_ferentvertical CZs
CZ = 1000
CZ = 1500
CZ = 2000 fl
Effect of Departure time
No randomization
5min. random
lOmin, random
Effect of resolution
strategy,
Original strategy,
CZ = 5 nm
29431 16930
Number of
Unresolved
Conflicts
>= FL 180
11442
65
351
1399
Alternate strategy,
CZ=5 nm
Original strategy,
CZ=3 nm
Alternate strategy,
CZ=3 nm
Effect of current
separation standard
CZ = 1000 ft
CZ = 1000 ft
for < FL 290
CZ = 2000 ft
for >= FL 290
3541
16470 14069
Number of flights
29061 7139 4720 351
29062 7308 4783 363
29576 7367 4803 368
29061 7139
29062 7163
4720 351
4404 293
29174 7270 4449 349
29061 7139 4720 351
29062 7103 4437 387
29019 4146 2774 68
29023 4094 2532 66
29061 7139 4720 351
29062 7376 4808 367
imulated = 26,673. All aircraft flew direct from origin to destination.
Table 1: Results of TAAM Simulation Runs
Scenario
Di/ferent lateral CZs
CZ = 3 nm
CZ=5 nm
CZ = 7.5 nm
CZ= lOnm
CZ= 15nm
Difjerent vertical CZs
Additional Time
Per Conflict
Resolution
(minutes)
0.12
0.28
0.46
0.58
0.77
Total # Conflicts In
Class A Airspace
In Simulation
2839
5071
8837
14057
30539
CZ = 1000 _ 0.28 5071
CZ = 1500 _ 0.28 5146
CZ = 2000 2.82 5171
0.28 5071
5 min. random 0.30 4697
10min. random 0.87 4798
Effect of Departure time
No randomization
Effect of resolution strateg?,
Original strategy,
CZ = 5 nm
Alternate strategy,
CZ = 5 nm
Original strategy,
CZ=3 nm
0.28
0.30
0.12
5071
4824
2842
Annual Additional
Direct Operating
Cost ($ millions)
Altemate strategy, 0.17 2598
CZ=3nm
Efject of current separation
standard
CZ = 1000 ft 0.28 5071 18 22
0.28 5175 18 22CZ = 1000 ft
for < FL 290
CZ = 2000 ft
for >= FL 290
1996 2007
4 5
18 22
51 62
102 124
292 353
18 22
18 22
182 220
18 22
17 21
52 63
18 22
18 22
4 5
5 7
Number of flights simulated = 26,673. All aircraft flew direct from origin to destination.
Annual number of flights predicted in 1996 = 24.1 million and in 2007 = 29.1 million
Table 2: Economic Effects Results
All the results presented in Table 2 include a scaling-up factor for unresolved conflicts.
The effect of including or not including the additional costs to resolve the unresolved conflicts in
the simulation is shown in Figure 4 for 1996 traffic. The upper curve includes the cost of the
resolved conflicts and the costs of resolving the unresolved conflicts that were obtained in the
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simulation, while the lower curve only includes the costs of resolved conflicts. These two curves
show that not including the costs of unresolved conflicts results in almost a "linear" increase with
lateral CZ size, whereas including these costs results in a much steeper increase with the slope
increasing with lateral CZ size. Increasing lateral CZ size increases the costs as a "quadratic"
function because the number of potential conflicts and the additional time per conflict resolution,
both increase with CZ size. However, in the simulation increasingly larger fractions of the
conflicts remain unresolved for larger CZ sizes (see Table 1), resulting in the almost "linear"
behavior of the lower curve.
In addition to the annual additional direct operating cost, Table 2 also shows the variation
in additional time per conflict resolution and total number of potential conflicts in Class A
airspace as per the simulation runs. These two fields are an important part of the cost results as
see in Equation (1). For a lateral CZ size of 5 nm the additional time per conflict is 0.28 minutes
(see Appendix A for a limited verification of this number). The additional time increases to 0.46
minutes for a lateral CZ size of 7.5 nm- equivalent to a difference of about 11 seconds per
conflict resolution maneuver. However, these "small" savings per conflict (going from a CZ size
of 7.5 nm to a CZ size of 5 nm) translate into "'large" annual savings ($ 33 million) because of
the large number of annual, potential conflicts that are avoided by a large number of flights.
Table 2 also shows that with increasing lateral CZ size the additional time per conflict resolution
and the total number of conflicts increase. This is explored further in Appendix B.
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Figure 5: Increased Annual Direct Operating Costs (in 1996 $) in Class A Airspace
Due to Different Lateral Control Zone Sizes
Figure 5 presents the graph of increased direct operating costs due to conflict resolutions
in Class A airspace versus increased lateral Control Zone (CZ) sizes. Typically, the lateral PZ is
5 nm in size. So, the CZ sizes (CZ includes the PZ and a buffer) are larger than 5 nm. Typically,
the CZ is expected to be in the 5 to 10 nm range. In Figure 5, the upper curve represents the
additional costs for projected 2007 traffic, while the lower curve represents the costs for the
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projected 1996 traffic. Note that the upper curve for projected 2007 traffic is higher due to the
increased number of flights which results in an increased number of conflicts. Both of these
curves show the same behavior with no deep knees or bends in the curves. To put these
additional costs in perspective with respect to 1996 traffic, the additional time for conflict
resolution with a CZ of 5 nm or 10 nm is 0.08% or 0.5% respectively, of the total flight times.
Figure 6 presents a graph of increased direct operating costs due to conflict resolutions in
Class A airspace, except in this case the abscissa has increased vertical (and not lateral) CZ sizes.
The left part of the histograms represents the additional costs for projected 2007 traffic, while the
right part of the histograms represents the costs for the projected 1996 traffic. This graph shows
that the costs due to increased (from 1000 feet) vertical separations is about the same until the
CZ size becomes 2000 feet, when the additional costs show a jump. This behavior is expected
due to the nature of the flight level rules for IFR traffic - where the traffic are separated in 1000
feet intervals. The additional time for conflict resolution with a CZ of 1500 and 2000 feet are
0.08% and 0.8% respectively, of the total flight times.
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Figure 6: Increased Annual Direct Operating Costs (in 1996 $) in Class A Airspace
Due to Different Vertical Control Zone Sizes
As previously mentioned, other simulations were performed to evaluate other effects that
could affect the results obtained for different CZ sizes. The results of these simulation runs,
presented in Table 2, confirm our a priori assumption that these effects are of a smaller order
than the effect of different CZ sizes:
1) Effect of Departure Time Randomization: Departure time randomization of 1996 traffic
showed that with no randomization, with 5 minute and 10 minute randomization, the
additional costs are 18, 17 and 52 million dollars respectively. Apparently, due to the large
number of flights simulated, on the average changing the departure times does not seem to
strongly affect the results.
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2) Effect of Conflict Resolution Strategy: Changing the conflict resolution strategy priorities in
TAAM from heading, altitude, and speed changes to a different priority of altitude, heading,
and speed changes also does not produce big differences in costs - it does not change for a
lateral CZ size of 5 nm and it changes from 4 to 5 million dollars for a lateral CZ size of 3 nm
for 1996 traffic.
3) Effect of current separation standards above FL 290: Increasing the vertical separation
standard above FL 290, from 1000 feet to 2000 feet, imperceptibly changes the costs.
Conclusions
A methodology was presented for estimating the order-of-magnitude increased direct
operating cost due to increased Control Zone (CZ) sizes in Class A airspace for direct route
flights. The results (in 1996 $) indicate:
1) Increasing lateral CZ size increases the costs as a "quadratic" function, where the costs of CZ
of 5 nm and 10 nm is 18 and 102 million dollars annually for 1996 traffic and is 22 and 124
million dollars annually for 2007 traffic.
2) Increasing vertical CZ size from 1000 feet increases the costs substantially only at CZ of
2000 feet. The costs of a 5 nm lateral and 2000 feet vertical CZ is 182 and 220 million
dollars annually for 1996 and 2007 traffic, respectively.
The cost estimates would be different in an alternate route structure, as there would be different
amount of conflicts in Class A airspace depending on the route structure. However, the pattern
of increase should be similar. Another limitation of this analysis is that the number of flights in
the simulation was roughly half the total number of IFR flights in a day. When the number of
aircraft in the simulation is increased, it is expected that the number of conflicts would increase
at more than a linear rate. A linear scaling-up technique has been used in this analysis. Better
input data to the simulation, related to the flights per day, should reduce this limitation of the
results.
In order to use the results of this study to compare different conflict detection and
resolution decision support tools, the decision maker must have an idea of the size of the CZs for
the various tools. Given that information, the decision maker can then use the results presented
in this paper to evaluate the differential costs between any two such decision support tool. This
study did not evaluate any of the above mentioned conflict detection and resolution decision
tools.
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Appendix A: Limited Verification Of Additional Time Per Conflict Resolution
The direct operating cost results are obtained from equations (1), (2), and (3) of the
methodology section. Equation (1), the primary equation, is based on the product of the
following quantities - Additional time per conflict, Total number of conflicts in class A airspace
in the simulation, Total number of flights per year, and the Direct operating cost rate. The latter
two quantities are well documented. The total number of conflicts in class A airspace that need
to be resolved can be verified only by performing an independent simulation under similar
assumptions. Its order of magnitude could also be ascertained by calibrating against the potential
conflicts that are resolved by air traffic controllers in the current air traffic system. The order of
magnitude of the additional time per conflict for the 5 nm lateral CZ size is established in this
appendix.
Clearly the additional time per conflict in any scenario is the combination of a number of
types of resolutions (changes in heading, altitude, and speed) and the potential conflict scenario
(flight path crossing angle, aircraft speeds, and distance at closest point of approach). The
conflict resolution strategy used in most scenarios was in order of priority changes in heading,
altitude, and speed. So, most of the resolutions were changes in heading, and so a simple
14
headingchangeconflict resolutionmaneuver,asshownin FigureA, is assumedin this appendix.
In this case,theoriginal flight pathof theaircraft is ABEF. To avoidthepotentialconflict in the
flight segmentBE, the aircraft is movedoff courseby 5 nm, and so the flight path including
conflict avoidanceis ABCDEF.
C
I
D
Figure A: A Sample Heading Change Conflict Resolution Maneuver
For this assumed conflict resolution maneuver the additional distance for the maneuver is
computed assuming a 30 degree heading change maneuver BC and DE. The additional distance
can be easily shown to be 2 × 5 × (cosecant(30) - cotangent(30) ) = 2.68 nm. Assuming an
aircraft speed of 8 nm/min, this converts to an additional time of 0.34 min. This number is
slightly larger than the average of 0.28 minutes additional time per conflict in the simulation
results (see Table 2). However, they are of the same magnitude.
Appendix B: Additional Detail Regarding Conflicts With Increased Lateral CZ Sizes
Table 2 showed that increasing the lateral CZ size increases the costs as a "quadratic"
function because the number of potential conflicts and the additional time per conflict resolution,
both increase with CZ size. These increases are explored in this Appendix. Figure B 1 plots the
number of conflicts with different lateral CZ sizes. The figure shows that increasing the lateral
CZ size "quadratically" increases the number of conflicts in the simulation. The most likely
explanation is that the number of conflicts is proportional to the CZ volume, which in this case
increases as the square of the lateral CZ size.
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Figure B 1: Total Number of Conflicts in Class A Airspace in Simulation
For Different Lateral Control Zone Sizes
Figure B2 plots the additional time per conflict resolution with different lateral CZ sizes.
The figure shows that increasing the lateral CZ size increases the time per conflict resolution in
15
the simulation. However, one would expect that this increase would be linearly proportional to
the CZ size, and instead it appears to increase linearly but then shows a reduced rate of increase.
The most likely explanation is that as it becomes harder to resolve conflicts laterally the conflicts
are resolved by changes in altitude and in speed, which would not increase linearly with CZ size.
This is borne out the numbers presented in Table B1.
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Figure B2" Additional Time Per Conflict Resolution For
Different Lateral Control Zone Sizes
Table B1 shows that as the CZ size increases a smaller percentage of the conflicts are
being resolved by changes in heading from a high of 86% for a CZ size of 3 nm to a low of 68%
for a CZ size of 15 nm. These decreases are accompanied by almost even increases in the
percentages of conflict resolutions through changes in altitude and speed.
Control Zone Size
(nm)
Percentage of Conflict Resolution Maneuvers in Simulation
Headin_ Chan_;es Altitude Changes
3 86 10
5 82 12 6
7.5 77 14 9
10 74 16 10
15 68 19 13
Speed Changes
4
Table B l" Types of Conflict Resolution Maneuvers with Different Lateral Control Zone Sizes
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